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1. Introduction 
The major goal of the present paper is to construct a new approach to equilibrium 
selection for very general normal form game situations, especially, those games 
consist of two groups of populations. The existence and uniqueness of the new game 
equilibrium induced by stochastic group evolution and rational individual choice have 
been proved, and also the stability of the game equilibrium is confirmed from both 
time (i.e., in the sense of stochastic stopping time) and space (i.e., from the viewpoint 
of invariant probability measure) dimensions, which is different from the classical 
approach of Kohlberg and Mertens (1986). Furthermore, Theorem 1 in section 2 not 
only provides us with the explicit form of the new game equilibrium but also provides 
us with the explicit time length needed so that the game equilibrium can be achieved 
by decentralized players. And this would be regarded as an important characteristic of 
the new game equilibrium relative to traditional approach (see, Samuelson and Zhang, 
1992; Kandori et al., 1993; Young, 1993; Matsui and Matsuyama, 1995; Foster and 
Young, 2003; Binmore et al., 2003). 
Noting that both evolutionary game theory and rational choice theory have very 
important economic implications, the current paper introduces a new game 
equilibrium by combining both of the above, i.e., evolutionary game theory (see, 
Friedman, 1991; Ritzberger and Weibull, 1995; Hofbauer and Sigmund, 2003; 
Benaïm and Weibull, 2003, and among others) corresponds to group-level 
deterministic or stochastic evolution via both the well-known random-matching rule 
(e.g., Ellison, 1994; Zhou, 1999; Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2004; Duffie and Sun, 
2007; Aliprantis et al., 2007, and among others) and deterministic or stochastic 
replicator dynamics (e.g., Foster and Young, 1990; Fudenberg and Harris, 1992; 
Binmore et al., 1995; Cabrales, 2000; Corradi and Sarin, 2000; Imhof, 2005; Benaïm 
et al., 2008, and among others) while rational choice theory (see, Harsanyi, 1966; 
Bernheim, 1984; Aumann, 1987, and among others) corresponds to individual-level 
and decentralized rational decision. Most importantly, the present paper successfully 
shows that optimal stopping theory that has been widely applied in mathematical 
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finance (see, Myneni, 1992; Shepp and Shiryaev, 1993; Hobson, 1998; Guo and 
Shepp, 2001; Avram et al., 2004; Choi et al., 2004; Alili and Kyprianou, 2005) plays a 
crucial role in characterizing and finally demonstrating the existence and uniqueness 
of the new game equilibrium. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 introduces the model 
where the formal definition of the new game equilibrium is given and the existence 
and uniqueness of the game equilibrium are proved; section 3 demonstrates the 
stability of the game equilibrium from both time and space dimensions; section 4 
concludes and the Appendix provides the main mathematical derivations. 
 
2. The Model 
Let 
1 2I I
A   be the payoff matrix for row-players and 1 2I IB   be the payoff matrix 
for column-players with 
1 2I I
A  , 1 2I IB   1 2I I , and 1I , 2I 1 . Here, and throughout 
the current paper, we study the replicator dynamics of 1 2I I  normal form games 




M t M  , where 1 ( )iM t  denotes 





N t N  , where 
2 ( )iN t  denotes the number of strategy- 2i  players at period t . And, we introduce the 
following technical assumption, 
ASSUMPTION 1: Throughout the current paper, both M  and N , sufficiently 
large, are assumed to be finite constants. 
REMARK 2.1: Some of existing literatures (see, Fudenberg et al., 2004; Nowak et 
al., 2004; Imhof and Nowak, 2006, and among others) have confirmed that 
Assumption 1 has very important implications. That is to say, on the one hand, 
Assumption 1 is used to make things much easier from the viewpoint of pure 
mathematics; and also, Assumption 1 is indeed without loss of any generality in the 
sense of economic and biological intuitions on the other hand. 
We let 1 1( ) ( )i iX t M t M , 2 2( ) ( )i iY t N t N  denote the frequencies of 
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strategies 1i  and 2i , respectively, with 1 11,2,...,i I  and 2 21, 2,...,i I . Therefore, 
the average payoffs of strategy 1i  and strategy 2i  are given by  1, ( )u i Y t   
1
( )Tie AY t  and   22 , ( ) ( )T Tiu i X t e B X t , respectively, with the superscript “ T ” 
denoting transpose, and  11( ) ( ),..., ( ),iX t X t X t 1..., ( ) TIX t , ( )Y t   21( ),..., ( ),iY t Y t  
2..., ( ) TIY t , and also 1 (0,...,1,...,0)Tie  , 2 (0,...,1,...,0)Tie  , where the 1i -th entry 
and 2i -entry are ones, respectively, for 1 11,2,...,i I  and 2 21, 2,...,i I . 









 ( ), iW   the filtered 
probability space with ( )









  the ( )iW   augmented filtration 
generated by d  dimensional standard Brownian motion  ( ),0 ( )i iW t t     
with ( )





  ,    ( )
iW   and ( )i   a stopping time, to be endogenously 
determined. Moreover, we define  ,i iN dt dz     1 1,i iN dt dz  ,...,  , Ti in nN dt dz    
         1 1 1 1, ,..., , Ti i i i i i i in n n nN dt dz dz dt N dt dz dz dt             , in which   1nil lN     
are independent Poisson random measures with Lévy measures il  coming from 
n  independent (1-dimensional) Lévy processes 1 ( )




t i i iz N ds dz     , …, 
( )in t   
00
,
t i i i
n n nz N ds dz        with 0     0 , and then the corresponding 

























 ,   ( )iN    
and ( )i   a stopping time, to be endogenously determined. Thus, we are provided 






 , i , where i  ( )iW    
( )iN   , i  ( )iW   ( )iN  , it   ( )
iW
t
  ( )iNt  , i  ( )
iW   ( )iN   and 






  denotes the corresponding filtration satisfying the well-known 
“usual conditions”. Here, and throughout the current paper, i  is used to denote the 
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expectation operator with respect to (w. r. t.) the probability law i  for 
 1,2,...,i I   and for 1,2  . Naturally, we have stochastic basis  , ,    
 
0 ( )t t 

   ,   with   1  ...  I ,   1  ...  I , t   1t   
...  It  ,   1  ...  I , ( )   1( )   ...  ( )I   1( )   ...   
( )I   if 1  , and ( )   1( )   ...  ( )I   1( )   ...  ( )I   if 2   
with    ,    
0 ( )t t 

    denoting the corresponding filtration satisfying 
the usual conditions, and   is used to denote the expectation operator with respect 
to (w. r. t.) the probability law   for 1, 2  . 
We now define the canonical Lebesgue measure   on measure space  ,  
 B  with    0, ,   (0, )  and  B  the Borel sigma-algebra, 
and also the corresponding regular properties about Lebesgue measure are supposed 
to be fulfilled. Thus, we can define the following product measure spaces 
 i    , i   B  and      ,    B  with corresponding product 
measures   i  and    , respectively, for  1,2,...,i I   and for 
1, 2  . 
Now, based upon the probability space  , ,i i   i , i  for 1,2  , and 
following Fudenberg and Harris (1992), Cabrales (2000), Imhof (2005), Benaïm et al 
(2008), Hofbauer and Imhof (2009), the stochastic replicator dynamics of the two 
groups of populations can be respectively given as follows, 
   1 11 1 1 1 1 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0
1 11 1
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) , ,
d n
i i i i i iT
i i k k i l l l l
k l
dM t M t e AY t dt t dW t t z N dt dz 
 
        , 
   2 22 2 2 2 2 22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
0
2 21 1
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) , ,
d n
i i i i i iT T
i i k k i l l l l
k l
dN t N t e B X t dt t dW t t z N dt dz 
 
          
where 1 ( )iM t  is  1i   B adapted, 2 ( )iN t  is  2i   B adapted, ( )Y t  is 
 2   B adapted, ( )X t  is  1   B adapted, 1 1 ( )i k t  and  11 1 1, ii l lt z  are 
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 1i   B progressively measurable, and 2 2 ( )i k t  and  22 2 2, ii l lt z  are 2i  B  
   progressively measurable, for  1 11,2,...,i I ,  2 21, 2,...,i I ,  1 1, 2,k   
1...,d ,  2 21, 2,...,k d ,  1 11, 2,...,l n  and  2 21, 2,...,l n . Notice from 
Assumption 1 that the sizes of the two populations are finite constants, based on Itô’s 
rule one can easily find, 
   1 11 1 1 1 1 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0
1 11 1
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) , ,
d n
i i i i i iT
i i k k i l l l l
k l
dX t X t e AY t dt t dW t t z N dt dz 
 
         
   1 1 1 1 1 1 111
0
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) , ,n
i i i i i i iT
iX t e AY t dt t dW t t z N dt dz        
       1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 11
0
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), ,n
i i i i i i i i i if X t dt g X t dW t h X t z N dt dz    , 
   2 22 2 2 2 2 22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
0
2 21 1
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) , ,
d n
i i i i i iT T
i i k k i l l l l
k l
dY t Y t e B X t dt t dW t t z N dt dz 
 
          
   2 2 2 2 2 2 222
0
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) , ,n
i i i i i i iT T
iY t e B X t dt t dW t t z N dt dz         
       2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 22
0
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), ,n
i i i i i i i i i if Y t dt g Y t dW t h Y t z N dt dz    , (1) 
subject to 1 (0) (0,...,0)i TW   1i  a.s., 2 (0) (0,...,0)i TW   2i  a.s., (0)X    
 1X (0), 1 1..., (0),..., (0) Ti IX X   1 11,..., ,..., Ti Ix x x  0x   1  a.s., (0)Y     1Y  
(0), 2 2..., (0),..., (0) Ti IY Y   2 21,..., ,..., Ti Iy y y  0y   2  a.s., 1 ( )iX t  is assumed 
to be  1i   B adapted, and 2 ( )iY t  is assumed to be  2i   B adapted, 
for   1i  11, 2,..., I  and  2i  21, 2,..., I . Moreover, with a little abuse of notations, 
we put 1 (0)i   11(0),i 1 1..., (0),...,i k 1 1 (0) Ti d   11,i 1 1..., ,...,i k 1 1 Ti d  1i , 
 1 10,i iz    111 10, ii z  11 1 1,..., 0, ,...,ii l lz  11 1 10, Tii n nz    111 1ii z  11 1 1,..., ,...,ii l lz
 11 1 1 Tii n nz   1 1i iz , 2 (0)i   21(0),i 2 2..., (0),...,i k 2 2 (0) Ti d   21,i 2 2..., ,...,i k  
2 2 Ti d  2i , and  2 20,i iz     221 10, ii z  ,...,  22 2 20, ii l lz  ,...,   22 2 20, Tii n nz    
  221 1ii z ,...,  22 2 2ii l lz ,...,  22 2 2 Tii n nz   2 2i iz , for  1i  11, 2,..., I  and  2i  1,2,  
2..., I . Moreover, we have, 
  7
       1 1
0
1 1 1 1 1 1 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), ,I ndX t f X t dt g X t dW t h X t z N dt dz     , 
       2 2
0
2 2 2 2 2 2 2( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), ,I ndY t f Y t dt g Y t dW t h Y t z N dt dz     ,      (2) 
with ( )X t   1 11( ),..., ( ),..., ( ) Ti IX t X t X t  and ( )Y t   2 21( ),..., ( ),..., ( ) Ti IY t Y t Y t . 
Next, we introduce some necessary assumptions, 
ASSUMPTION 2: The initial conditions 1 (0)iX  1ix 0 , 2 (0)iY  2iy 0 , 
(0)X  x 0  and (0)Y  y 0  are all supposed to be deterministic and bounded 
for  1i  1, 2, 1..., I  and  2i  1,2, 2..., I . Furthermore, 1 0i   1i  a.s., 2 0i   
2i  a.s.,  11 1 1, ii l lt z  111 il     1i  a.e., and  22 2 2, ii l lt z  221 il     2i   
a.e., for  1
1
i
l 0 , 22il 0  and for  1i  1, 2, 1..., I ; 2i  1,2, 2..., I ; 1l  1,2, ..., 1n  
and 2l  1,2, ..., 2n . 
ASSUMPTION 3: The following linear growth and local Lipschitz continuity 
conditions are fulfilled, respectively, 







i i i i i i i i i i i
l l l
l
f x g x h x z dz C x

    , 







i i i i i i i i i i i
l l l
l
f y g y h y z dz C y

    , 
         1 1 1 1 1
0
1






f x g x h x z dz C x

    , 
         2 2 2 2 2
0
2






f y g y h y z dz C y

    , 
for some constants 1iC , 2iC , 1C , 2C   . And, 
       1 1 1 1 1 1 1 12 2
2
ˆ ˆi i i i i i i if x f x g x g x     





ˆ ˆ, , i
n
i i i i i i i i i i i
l l l l R
l
h x z h x z dz L x x

   , 
       2 2 2 2 2 2 2 22 2
2
ˆ ˆi i i i i i i if y f y g y g y     
  8





ˆ ˆ, , i
n
i i i i i i i i i i i
l l l l R
l
h y z h y z dz L y y

   , 
       2 21 1 1 1
2 2
ˆ ˆf x f x g x g x     
     1 1 1 1 11 1
0
1







h x z h x z dz L x x

   , 
       2 22 2 2 2
2 2
ˆ ˆf y f y g y g y     
     2 2 2 2 22 2
0
2







h y z h y z dz L y y

   , 
for any given constants 1iR , 2iR , 1R , 2R 0  with 1 1 1ˆi i ix x R  , 2 2 2ˆi i iy y R  , 
1
2 2
ˆx x R  , 2
2 2
ˆy y R  , and constants 1 1iiRL , 2 2iiRL , 11RL , 22RL    that 
depend only on 1iR , 2iR , 1R  and 2R , respectively, for all 1ix , 1ˆ ix , 2iy , 2ˆ iy   ; 
x , xˆ  1I  and y , yˆ  2I  with  11( ) 1,lh x z ,  11( ) 1ˆ,lh x z  representing the 
1l -th columns of matrixes  1 1,h x z ,  1 1ˆ,h x z , respectively, and  22( ) 2,lh y z , 
 22( ) 2ˆ,lh y z  denoting the 2l -th columns of matrixes  2 2,h y z ,  2 2ˆ,h y z , 
respectively, for  1l  1,2, ..., 1n , 2l  1,2, ..., 2n , and also  1i  1, 2, 1..., I , 2i  1,  
2, 2..., I . 
REMARK 2.2: (i) Provided Assumption 3, the existence and uniqueness of strong 
solutions of the Lévy SDEs given in (1) and (2) are ensured, respectively. 
(ii) Assumption 3 is indeed weak in the following sense, local Lipschitz 
continuity conditions can be naturally satisfied for any 1C  functions or 
correspondences thanks to the Mean Value Theorem. 
(iii) Here, and throughout the current paper, | |  is used to denote absolute value, 
2|| ||  is used to represent both Euclidean vector norm and the Frobenius (or trace) 
matrix norm, and     is used to denote the scalar product. 
Now, as in the model of Fudenberg et al (2004), Nowak et al (2004), and Imhof 
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and Nowak (2006), we define the following expected discounted fitness functions, 
      1 1 11 12( , ), ( ) exp 1 ( )i i i Ti s y if t Y t t w w e AY t      , 
      2 2 22 21( , ), ( ) exp 1 ( )i i i T Ti s x if t X t t w w e B X t          . 
with 1i , 2i  0,1  (  1i  1, 2, 1..., I ; 2i  1,2, 2..., I ) denoting the discounted 
factors, 1iw , 2iw  0,1  (  1i  1, 2, 1..., I ; 2i  1,2, 2..., I ) the parameters that 
measure the contributions of the matrix payoffs of the game to the fitness of the 
corresponding strategies, and 2( , )s y , 1( , )s x  representing the expectation operators w. 
r. t. the complete probability law 2 , 1  with depending on initial conditions ( , )s y  
     20,1 I  and ( , )s x      10,1 I , respectively. Thus, the problem facing us is, 
PROBLEM 1: We need to demonstrate that there exist two vectors of 1   
stopping times  1 11( ) ( ),..., ( ),..., ( ) Ti I           with   1  and 2   
stopping times  2 21( ) ( ),..., ( ),..., ( ) Ti I              with   2  such that, 
  1 11 ( ), ( )i iif Y      





sup exp ( ) 1 ( )
i
i i i i iT
s y iw w e AY 
    

           , 
     1 1 1 1 111 2( , ) exp ( ) 1 ( )i i i i iTs y iw w e AY                . 
And simultaneously, 
  2 22 ( ), ( )i iif X        





sup exp ( ) 1 ( )
i
i i i i iT T
s x iw w e B X 
    

        
        , 
     2 2 2 2 222 1( , ) exp ( ) 1 ( )i i i i iT Ts x iw w e B X                     . 
with 1 1( ) ( )i k      ( 1 1i k , 1i , 1k  1, 2, 1..., I ) 1  a.s. and 2 2( ) ( )i k       
( 2 2i k , 2i , 2k  1, 2, 2..., I ) 2  a.s.. 
   REMARK 2.3: Indeed, 1iw , 2iw  0,1  ( 1i  1, 2, 1..., I ; 2i  1,2, 2..., I ) can be 
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regarded as objective parameters that measure the intensity of evolutionary selection 
(see, Ohtsuki et al., 2007), and also, this specification reflects the idea that, in reality, 
individuals or players inclined to use different strategies may feel different importance 
of the game payoff to their fitness, thereby determining different degrees of 
participation which in turn will greatly affect the strategy choice of the players.  
DEFINITION 1 (Game Equilibrium): The solution, if it exists, to Problem 1 
defines a game equilibrium induced by stochastic group evolution and rational 
individual choice corresponding to the very general normal form game situations. 
REMARK 2.4: Here, and throughout the current paper, we study the game 
equilibrium by employing evolutionary game theory under uncertainty, which implies 
that the game equilibrium is characterized from the viewpoint of group level, thereby 
leading to a case where classical optimal control theory is not suitable for rational 
individual choice while stochastic optimal stopping theory is powerful and hence 
plays a crucial role in proving and characterizing the existence and uniqueness of the 
game equilibrium. Nevertheless, on the other hand, it is specifically worth 
emphasizing that the game equilibrium is achieved through decentralized rational 
individual choice of many players in the corresponding game although the game 
equilibrium is characterized in the sense of group level based upon the classical 
evolutionary game theory. 
We now define  ( ) , ( )Z t s t X t   for  t    with (0)Z  ( , )s x     
  10,1 I , and  ( ) , ( )Z t s t Y t  for  t    with (0)Z  ( , )s y      20,1 I . 
And also we let ( , )f s x   1 1 1( , ),..., ( , ),..., ( , )i I Tf f fx x xs x s x s x       ,  1 1 11 11( ) ,l l lx x z  ...  
   1 1 1 11 1 1 1 1 1, ,..., Ti i I Ii l l I l lx z x z  , ( , )f s y   1 2 2( , ),..., ( , ),..., ( , )i I Tf f fy y ys y s y s y      and 2l  
( )y       2 2 2 22 2 2 2 2 2 2 21 11 ,..., ,..., Ti i I Il l i l l I l ly z y z y z     . Then the characteristic operators 
of ( )Z t  and ( )Z t  can be respectively given by, 
 1 1 1 1
1 1





f ff s x s x x e Ay s x
s x
   
   
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1 ( , )
2 ( )










    1 1 1 11 1 1 1
0
1 11 1
, ( ) ( , ) ( , ), ( )
I n
k k
l l l l
k l
f s x x f s x f s x x dz  
 
         , 
 f   1 12 IC  . 
And, 
 2 2 2 2
2 1





f ff s y s y y e B x s y
s y
      






1 ( , )
2 ( )







     
    2 2 2 22 2 2 2
0
2 21 1
, ( ) ( , ) ( , ), ( )
I n
k k
l l l l
k l
f s y y f s y f s y y dz  
 
        , 
 f   2 12 IC  . 











x 1 . Let 1 11 2 21I ii x   , then we get 1 1 1 2Ix      with 2 10 1    . 






x     , then we have 1 1( 3)3 I Ix x    1 13 2I I    with 
0 
1 2I





x     , i.e., 1x 1 1I  , then we get 2x   
1 1( 2)I Ix   
1 2I
  1 1I   with 0  1 1I   1 2I   1 3I   ...  1 1  . And without loss of 
any generality, we put 0 1  . Then we obtain, 
     12 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1
1
1





i i i i I i i I i I i
i
u i x e B x b b x b b     

      . 




y 1  and let 2 22 1 11I ii y    , then we have 2Iy   






y    , then we see that 2 1 1 2Iy       with 0   





y      , then we have 2 2( 3)3 I Iy y    2 3I   
2 2I





y      , i.e., 1y 2 1I   , 
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then it follows that 2y  2 2( 2)I Iy   
2 2I
  2 1I    with 0  2 1I   2 2I   2 3I   ...   
1 1 . And we, without loss of any generality, put 0 1  . Then we get, 
     21 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 2
2
1





i i i i I i i I i I i
i
u i y e Ay a a y a a     

        . 
Therefore, the fitness functions become, 
   11 1, exp iif s y s   
            21 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 2
2
1





i i i I i i I i I i
i
w w a a y a a     

                 , 
                                                    1i  1, 2, 1..., I . 
   22 1, exp iif s x s    
            12 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1
1
1





i i i I i i I i I i
i
w w b b x b b     

                , 
                                                 2i  1, 2, 2..., I . (3) 
with 0 
2 1I
   2 2I   2 3I   ...  1 0 1   and 0  1 1I   1 2I   1 3I   ...  1   
0 1 . And inspection of the fitness functions given in (3) reveals that one can just 
define  1( ) , ( )Z t s t X t   for  t    with (0)Z   1,s x     0,1 , and 
 1( ) , ( )Z t s t Y t  for  t    with (0)Z   1,s y     0,1 . And hence the 
corresponding characteristic operators of ( )Z t  and ( )Z t  are respectively given by, 
       1 1 1 11 1, , ,Tf ff s x s x x e Ay s xs x   
       221 1 1 11 21 ,2 ( )T fx s xx   

 
           1 11 1 1 1 1 1
0
1






l l l l l lx
l
f s x x z f s x x z s x dz     


  , 
 f   2 2C  . 
And, 
       1 1 1 11 1, , ,T Tf ff s y s y y e B x s ys y         




T fy s y
y
      
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           2 12 2 2 2 2 2
0
2






l l l l l ly
l
f s y y z f s y y z s y dz         
 f   2 2C  . 
Therefore, based upon the above assumptions and specifications, the following 
theorem is derived, 
THEOREM 1: There exists a unique solution to Problem 1 under very weak 
conditions, and accordingly the existence and uniqueness of the game equilibrium are 
confirmed. 
PROOF: See Appendix A. ▌ 
REMARK 2.5: It is especially worth noting that Theorem 1 not only shows the 
existence and uniqueness of the game equilibrium given by Definition 1 but also 
provides us with the explicit time length needed so that the game equilibrium can be 
achieved by decentralized players. And hence this would be regarded as one major 
characteristic of the corresponding game equilibrium relative to the traditional 
approach and hence Nash equilibrium concept (see, Nash, 1950, 1951). 
 
3. Stability of the Game Equilibrium 
By solving Problem 1 defined in the previous section, we get the optimal 
stopping times as follows, 





  determined by (A.5). And, 





  is given by (A.13). Moreover, it follows from Theorem 1 that the new 
game equilibrium is characterized via letting 
1 1
1 1 1 1
1 2 ... ...i Iy y y y
        , 1 11 2x x     
2 2
1 1... ...i Ix x
     , and meanwhile      in (A.15) and       in (A.16).That 
is to say, we get from Theorem 1 that 
2
2 1
2Iy y   , 2 23 3 2I Iy       , … , 2Iy    
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1 1   and 12 12Ix x   , 1 13 3 2I Ix      , … , 1Ix   1 1  with 1 1 11 2y y y     

1 1
1 1... ...i Iy y
     and 1 1 11 2x x x    2 21 1... ...i Ix x     . In what follows, we are 
encouraged to show the stability of the game equilibrium. And we do so by first 
giving some necessary definitions and assumptions, 
DEFINITION 2 (Simplex of Evolutionary Dynamics): Here, and throughout the 
present paper, we put  2 2 21 2(0,1) ; ... ... 1I i Iy y y y y         and   x   
1 1 11 2(0,1) ; ... ... 1I i Ix x x x       as the simplexes of evolutionary dynamics. If we 
set up  2 21 ,..., ,..., Ti Iy y y y    and x    1 11 ,..., ,..., Ti Ix x x  , then we always get 
y cl    and x cl    with cl  and cl  denoting the closures of   and  , 
respectively. 
ASSUMPTION 4: We, without loss of any generality, assume that y  , x  
 , there exists a unique invariant probability measure   on  , and there exists a 
unique invariant probability measure   on  . 
REMARK 3.1: It is especially worth noting that we employ Assumption 4 is just 
for the sake of simplicity. Indeed, the existence and uniqueness of the probability 
measure can be ensured under certain weak conditions (see, Garay and Hofbauer, 
2003), and one can also refer to Theorem 2.1 of Imhof (2005) and Theorem 3.1 of 
Benaïm et al (2008) for much more details. 
ASSUMPTION 5: There exist constants L    and L    such that, 
     1 1 1 11 1
0
1
222 21( ) 1( )1 1 1 1 1 1
22 2 21





x x f x g x h x z dz h x z L x 

      , 
     2 2 2 22 2
0
2
222 22( ) 2( )2 2 2 2 2 2
22 2 21





y y f y g y h y z dz h y z L y 

    
where      1 11 1 11( ) 1( )1 11,2,...,, max ,l ll I nh x z h x z   and      2 22 2 22( ) 2( )2 21,2,...,, max ,l ll I nh y z h y z   
for  x ,  y , and x  and y  are given by Definition 2. 
Now, the following lemma can be derived, 
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LEMMA 1: Based upon the above definitions and assumptions, then there exist 
two constants  , ( ), ,p x x        and  , ( ), ,p y y       with 1( )      




sup ( ) , ( ), ,
p
t






    




sup ( ) , ( ), ,
p
t






     . 
for  p  and 2p  . 
PROOF: See Appendix B. ▌ 
Then, the stability theorem of the game equilibrium can be established and 
expressed as follows, 
THEOREM 2 (Stability of the Game Equilibrium): Based upon Lemma 1 and the 





( ) pB x
dist x x

   

       , 






( ) pB y
dist y y

   

     , 
(b.2)   1 1pB y         , 
where, 
   2( ) ; ( ) , 0B x X t cl X t x t         , 
    ( ) ( ) inf 0; ( , )B x t X t B x clB x              , 
   2( ) ; ( ) , 0B y Y t cl Y t y t       , 
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    ( ) ( ) inf 0; ( , )B y t Y t B y clB y         , 





dist x x x   ,    22 2 22 1, log iiI yii ydist y y y    denote the 
Kullback-Leibler distances between (0)x X  and x , and (0)y Y  and y , 
respectively, with p   , p   and for  0  , 0  ,  p  and 
2p  . 
PROOF: See Appendix C. ▌ 
REMARK 3.2: Theorem 2 brings the idea from Theorem 2.1 of Imhof (2005) and 
also one can refer to the similar technique employed by Dai (2012). It follows from 
Theorem 1 and Definition 2 that x  and y  equivalently characterize the game 
equilibrium given by Definition 1, hence Theorem 2 confirms the stability of the 
game equilibrium from both time dimension (i.e., stochastic stopping time) and space 
dimension (i.e., invariant probability measure). 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we have studied a new approach to equilibrium selection for very 
general normal form games. The basic economic intuition behind the approach is very 
simple, i.e., classical evolutionary game theory emphasizes the deterministic or 
stochastic evolution of the populations as a group or many groups while rational 
individual choice theory also has very important economic implications, that is, the 
present paper chooses the way that reasonably combines both group-level stochastic 
evolution and individual-level rational choice. By noting that optimal control theory 
(i.e., dynamic optimization theory) is not suitable for the present case, we do so by 
introducing optimal stopping theory into classical evolutionary game theory. And 
hence the existence and uniqueness of the new game equilibrium have been 
demonstrated. Moreover, the stability of the new game equilibrium is confirmed from 
both time and space dimensions.  
Noting that our approach provides us with a general framework, the 
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corresponding applications will be very rich, e.g., inducing cooperative equilibrium in 
PD games and Pareto optimal equilibrium in coordination games. Finally, our 
approach can be easily extended to include multiple priors (see, Riedel, 2009, for 
instance) and also study evolutionary dynamics and corresponding equilibria in 
complex networks (see, Pacheco et al., 2006, for example) and on graphs (see, 





A. Proof of Theorem 1. 
STEP 1: For strategy 1i ,  1 11,2,...,i I . Notice that, 
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Hence, we have, 
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And it is natural to guess that the continuation region 1iD  has the following form, 
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Notice that the generator of ( )Z t  is given by, 
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(1) iT Tih e B x    and  111limi iih    . 
Therefore, if we assume that, 
1
1
iT Te B x  ,                                                  (A.3) 
Then we find that there exists 1 1i   such that, 
 11 0iih   .                                                  (A.4) 
with this value of 1i  we put, 
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for some constant 1 0iC  , to be determined. We, without loss of any generality, 




  and this leads us to the following 
“high contact” conditions, 
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Combining the above equations shows that, 
 
 
















i i i i I i i I i I ii i
ii i i ii
w w a a y a aC y





    

        
  
    
  
   
21 1 1








i I i i I i I ii
i i i
i i
w w a a
y
w a a
   

   
        
  
.          (A.5) 
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Hence, by (A.4), (A.5) and (A.6), we can define, 
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which holds by (A.2). Secondly, to prove, 
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It is easy to see that the proof is quite similar to that of case 1.1, so we take it omitted. 
 
STEP 2: For strategy 2i ,  2 21, 2,...,i I . Notice that, 
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So it is natural to guess that the continuation region 2iD  has the following form, 
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Notice that the generator of ( )Z t  is given by, 
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(1) iTih e Ay     and  222limi iih      . 
Consequently, if we suppose that, 
2
1
iTe Ay   ,                                                   (A.9) 
Thus, it is easily seen that there exists 2 1i   such that, 
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 22 0iih    .                                                 (A.10) 
with this value of 2i  we put, 
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in which 2 0iC   is some constant that remains to be determined. If we require that 
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If we require that 
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So, combining equation (A.11) and equation (A.12) yields, 
 
 
















i i i i I i i I i I ii i
ii i i ii
w w b b x b bC x





    






    
  
   
12 2 2








i I i i I i I ii
i i i
i i
w w b b
x
w b b
   

   
        
  
  .          (A.13) 






















.                                           (A.14) 
Then, by applying equation (A.10), equation (A.13) and equation (A.14), we are in 
the position to prove that       22 22 1 1, exp ii iif s x s C x        is a supermeanvalued 
majorant of  
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which holds by (A.8). Secondly, to show that, 
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                                                  for 
2
1 10 ix x
   . 
Define 
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i i i I i i I i I i
i
C x w w b b x b b
      

         
   . 
Then with our chosen values of 2iC  and 2i , we see that    2 22 21 1 0i ii ix x     . 
Furthermore, noting that      22 2 2 2 21 11 ii i i ix C x           , and hence  2 1 0i x    
holds for 
2
1 10 ix x
    given 2 1i   in (A.10), that is,  2 1 0i x   follows for 
2
1 10 ix x
   . And hence the desired result is established. 
 
Case 2.2: 
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Similar to case 1.2 and we take the proof of case 2.2, which is quite similar to that of 
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case 2.1, omitted. 
 
STEP 3: The existence and uniqueness of the game equilibrium. 
It follows from the requirements of Problem 1 that 1 11 2 ...y y
















   ( 1 1i k  , 1 1 1, 1, 2,...,i k I ), then one can 
easily see that, 
1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 1,23 2 ,34 3 , 1, 1
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1 1i k  , 1 1 1, 1, 2,...,i k I ; 2 22,3,..., 1j I  . 
Accordingly, we have, 
2 2
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23,23 23,34 23, 1,
1, ,23 1, ,34 1, , 1, ( 1) ( 2)
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I I
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1, ( 1) 1I I I  
       
 . 
which implies that, 
    .                                                    (A.15) 
where “ ” denotes Moore-Penrose generalized inverse. 
Similarly, we obtain 1 11 2 ...x x
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2 2i k  , 2 2 2, 1, 2,...,i k I ; 1 12,3,..., 1j I  . 
Consequently, we obtain, 
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which leads us to the following equation, 
     .                                                    (A.16) 
where “ ” stands for the Moore-Penrose generalized inverse. 
To summarize, we get the following theorem, 
THEOREM 1’: If we are provided that 11
iT Te B x   in (A.3) and 21 iTe Ay    in 
(A.9), then Problem 1 is solved as long as      in (A.15) and       in 
(A.16). That is, the existence and uniqueness of the game equilibrium are confirmed. 
Therefore, Theorem 1 is established thanks to Theorem 1’.                ▌ 
 
B. Proof of Lemma 1. 
By Itô’s rule, we obtain from (2) that, 
 2 2 1
2 2 0
( ) (0) 2 ( ) , ( )
t
X t x X x X s x f X s ds        
              1 1
0
2 ( ) , ( ) ( )
t
X s x g X s dW s    21 20 ( )t g X s ds  
                1 1 1 1 1
0
1
21( ) 1 1 1
0 21
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I n t l
l l
l
h X s z dz ds

   
                  1 1 1 1 1 1
0
1
1( ) 1( )1 1 1 1
0
1
( ), , ( ), ,
I n t l l
l l
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h X s z h X s z N ds dz

    
                1 1 1 1 1
0
1
1( ) 1 1 1
0
1
2 ( ) , ( ), ,
I n t l
l l
l
X s x h X s z N ds dz

    , 
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Then for 1 0, ( )t       with 2 21( ) ( ) ... ( ) ... ( )i I                 , and    
( )p  ( 2p  ), which may be different from line to line throughout the current 
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  
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   , 





sup ( ) (0) ( )
tp p p
t t
X t x X x X t dt 
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 
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    21 1 1 1 1
01 1
1( ) 1 1 1
00 1
sup ( ) , ( ), ,
p
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   
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     , 
for some  1 1 1 11, 2,..., ,...,l l I n  . Now, taking expectations on both sides and applying 






sup ( ) (0) ( )
tp p p
t t
X t x X x X t dt 
 
                     
  41 2 21 1
2 20
( ) ( )
p
t
X t x g X t dt      
    41 1 12 21( ) 1( )1 1 1
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  41 1 22 1( )1 1
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t lX t x h X t z dt
        ,     (B.1) 
Now, employing the Young Inequality (see, Higham et al, 2003), Hölder Inequality 
and Assumption 5 leads us to, 
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               ,                 (B.2) 
for that   appears in (B.1). Similarly, we obtain, 
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p
t lX t x h X t z dt
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t t
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And, 
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    ,                      (B.4) 
Substituting (B.2)-(B.4) into (B.1) yields, 
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tp p p p
t t
X t x X x X t dt X t 
 
                          , 
Thus, applying Assumption 2 and the following fact (see, Higham et al, 2003), 
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    
  , 
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which implies that there exists a constant  , ( ), ,p x x          such that, 
 1
20 ( )
sup ( ) , ( ), ,
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    
  . 
Similarly, one can also get, 
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sup ( ) , ( ), ,
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       . 
where 1 11( ) ( ) ... ( ) ... ( )i I              . And the required assertions follow 
and this completes the whole proof.                                       ▌ 
 
C. Proof of Theorem 2. 
We define the characteristic operator of ( )X t  as follows, 
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where, 
 1 1 11 11( ) ,l l lx x z  ...    1 1 1 11 1 1 1 1 1, ,..., Ti i I Ii l l I l lx z x z  , 
 1 11,..., ,..., (0)Ti Ix x x x X  . 
And we define the Kullback-Leibler distance (see, Bomze, 1991; Imhof, 2005) 
between x  and x  as follows, 
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1 1
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Thus, we have, 
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Then by Lemma 1, we get, 
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where, 
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      
    , 
is some positive constant. Now, define, 
   2( ) ; ( ) , 0B x X t cl X t x t         , 
    ( )ˆ( ) ( ) inf 0; ( , )B x t X t B x clB x                 , 
where  B x   denotes the closure of  B x  . Suppose that p   , for any 
x B   x , i.e.,  Cx B x   , we have, 
( )x       , 
by (C.1). Then, applying the well-known Dynkin’s formula yields,  
0  
  1 ˆ( )X t         
 ˆ( )1
0
( ) ( )
t
x X s ds
       
    
  1 ˆ( ) ( )px t             , 
Notice that ˆ( )t     ˆ( )   as t  , thus by using Lebesgue Monotone 
Convergence Theorem, we get, 
  1 ˆ0 ( ) ( )px             , 
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which implies that, 
 1 1
( )
,( )ˆ( ) ( ) p pB x
dist x xx

       

         
       , 
as required in (a.1). Moreover, for some constant ( )Q x  , we set up, 
  ( ) inf 0; ( , )Q t X t Q       . 
Then, by employing Dynkin’s formula and inequality in (C.1), 
0  
  1 ( )QX t         
 ( )1
0
( ) ( )Q
t
x X s ds
            
( )1 1
20
( ) ( ) ( )Q
t p
Qx X s x ds t
                     , 
If Q  , then ( )Qt t   , and application of Lebesgue Dominated 
Convergence Theorem reveals that, 
1
20
0 ( ) ( )
t p
x X s x ds t         , 
which implies that, 
1
20
1 ( )( )
t p xX s x ds
t t
      











      , 
which combines with Assumption 4 leads us to, 
   1 ( )01limsup ( , )CtC B xtB x X s dst                  












     
   
          p
 
  , 
where    stands for the characteristic function of the set  . Accordingly, one may 
  33
obtain, 
  1 1pB x           , 
which gives the desired result in (a.2). Noting that the proof of (b.1) and (b.2) is quite 
similar to that of (a.1) and (a.2) shown above, so we take it omitted. And hence the 
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